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FACT SHEET

Director of Plans, ODCSOPS
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8 April 1960

SUBJECT: Current Status of Summit Preparations (U)

1. (C) As the 16 May Summit approaches, the pace of preparations has stepped up. Every two weeks a major international meeting is being held. In Washington on 12 April the Foreign Ministers of US, UK, France and Germany are to meet. Their aim is to examine progress of the working groups and to give them further guidance. Final decisions are not expected to be taken at this meeting.

2. (S) Germany and Berlin

a. The four-power working group in Washington began this week to meet daily. Its aim now is to produce for the Foreign Ministers a substantive though preliminary report containing five principal sections:

- (1) Summary of Points to be Dealt with by Foreign Ministers
- (2) Estimate of Soviet Intentions
- (3) The German Question
- (4) The Berlin Question
- (5) Tactics of Summit Discussion

b. On Soviet intentions, everyone seems rather completely agreed. A new British paper submitted separately was found fully consistent with the original four-power working group estimate, in which the Army staff had concurred after ACSI and ODCSOPS study in February.

c. The section on the "German Question" emphasizes that reunification is the only basis for a genuine solution in Germany and for real security in Europe. Not hopeful of any progress toward it, the paper focuses on ways to avoid Soviet entrapment and to expose the oppressive and anti-democratic nature of Soviet and "GDR" policy.

d. Discussion of the "Berlin Question" is an analysis of whether any change might be worthwhile, the nature of possible changes, and the requirements which any new arrangements must fill. The latest version of the requirements is attached at Tab A, together with informal Army staff comments.

e. Informal Army staff comment on draft sections of this report is excerpted in Tab B.

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3. (S) East-West Relations

a. The working groups meeting in Paris and London have seemed to come closer to the relevant problems, although little new has emerged. Military implications of the material covered still appear to be few and indirect.

b. Aid to less-developed areas, done jointly with the Soviet Union, had been a French proposal. But under US-UK opposition, the French have reluctantly pared down their scheme to merely joint efforts in the field of health. US and UK have tentatively agreed.

c. Trade with the USSR, it has been tentatively concluded, is not a fit topic for Summit discussion, since neither a threat to peace nor a prospect of reduced tension is involved.

d. US is now pushing the idea of defining "peaceful co-existence" in a way to reveal to world opinion what the Soviets really mean when using it.

e. The possibility of mutual restraint in sending armaments, beyond internal security needs, to such areas as Africa has been proposed by the UK.


4. (U) Disarmament. Reported separately.

5. (U) Classification of paragraph 2 is derived from State Department draft "The Berlin Question", 1 April 1960 (SECRET); and classification of paragraph 3 is derived from State Department cable POLTO 1983, 1 April 1960, (SECRET).

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS:

2 Incl

1. TAB A-Reqts for a Modus Vivendi in Berlin
2. TAB B-Some informal Army Staff comments on Working Group Drafts


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TAB A

Requirements for a Modus Vivendi in Berlin

1. (S) General Negotiating Principles

a. Any change in the current arrangements concerning Berlin which would lessen Western ability to maintain the freedom of the City must be counter-balanced by an advantage which will demonstrably provide protection for the City to at least the same extent as the right which is modified.

b. The counter-balancing protection need not be of the same nature as the modified right: e.g., limitations on dissemination of propaganda might be exchanged for codification of access rights.

c. Under these principles it might be possible to avoid discussion of problems in the abstract and evolve a series of negotiating positions based upon concrete proposals.

d. Adoption of the principles would subject any proposal on Berlin to the following tests:

(1) Does the proposal immediately or potentially affect existing rights respecting Berlin or access thereto?

(2) If so, what are the probable consequences of accepting the proposal?

(3) If the consequences are adverse, what counter-advantages are presented by the proposal or should be required in order to protect the position of Berlin?

e. The general objective of any new arrangement is to ensure the security and freedom of Berlin as well as possible for as long as possible. The minimum requirements for accomplishing this objective will, however, vary somewhat according to whether a new arrangement provides for a new status or maintains the occupation regime.

(Army Staff Comment: Change first sentence to read: "The general) (objective of any new arrangements is to ensure the security and) (the freedom of the people of West Berlin. as-well-as-possible-for) (as-long-as-possible. REASON: Accuracy. The phrasing of the) (draft suggests the US would accept both a dilution of and an end) (to West Berliners' freedom.)

2.(S)Basic Requirements for Any New Arrangement

a. Political Freedom - A modus vivendi must assure the continuance of a constitutional government based on free elections and guaranteeing democratic process and civil rights.

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b. Security - A modus vivendi requires an international guarantee of Berlin's integrity and its freedom of access, plus a security force adequate not only to maintain internal order but also to ensure the operation of the international guarantee.

c. Freedom of Access - A modus vivendi should if possible reduce existing obstructions to the free movement of persons and goods between Berlin and the West; at least it should maintain freedom of access at its present level.

d. Economic Viability - A modus vivendi must ensure that Berlin's economic life is maintained at least at present levels; in practical terms this means that Berlin must be a part of the economic area of the Federal Republic.

e. Unity of Germany and Unity of Berlin

(1) Unity of Germany - A modus vivendi should avoid the creation of new obstacles to reunification. The "GDR" must be recognized as a de facto regime, and the principal of continuing Soviet responsibility in Germany must be maintained. A modus vivendi must not prejudice Berlin's role as the future all-German capital.

(2) Berlin and Federal Republic - A modus vivendi must not sever the ties which exist between Berlin and the Federal Republic.

(3) Unity of Berlin - A modus vivendi should prevent any further erosion of the principle of the unity of Berlin. Where it is not possible to deal with the city as a whole, changes made within the Western Sectors to satisfy Soviet demands should be accompanied by changes within the Soviet Sector acceptable to the Western Powers.

f. Self-Determination - A modus vivendi must be acceptable to the people of Berlin.

g. Reduction of Tension - A modus vivendi should, to the extent possible, reduce the tension which arises as a result of Berlin's position between the Free and Communist Worlds.

(Army Staff Comment: This should be revised to show that the cause)
(of tension is Soviet intransigence and aggressiveness, not the)
(physical position of Berlin. Vienna, with similar physical posi-)
(tion between the Free and Communist Worlds, was never subject to)
(such tension.)

3.(S)Additional Requirements if Berlin's Status is to be Changed

a. Security - Some security force must be established which is an adequate substitute for the Allied occupation forces. An effective NATO guarantee must be assured.

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(Army Staff Comment: Unacceptable. There can be no question of any substitute, or of removing Allied troops. Even in a theoretical analysis, the nature of the national objective rules that out of consideration. The freedom of West Berlin depends on the presence of US-UK-French troops.)

b. Recourse - There must be a method for expeditious settlement of disputes, including any interference with access or communications.

c. Freedom of Access - Rights of access and communications must be spelled out to ensure the maintenance of Berlin's political freedom and of its economy.

d. Duration - The new status must be either a step towards the reunification of Germany or valid until reunification.

4 (S) Additional Requirements if the Occupation Regime is to be Maintained

a. The continuing validity of basic Allied occupation rights until changed or terminated with the consent of the Occupying Powers must be recognized, at least by implication.

b. Allied forces must be maintained at the appropriate strength to carry out their mission in Berlin.

5. (S) Now Minimum Requirements are Met at Present

An important element of difficulty in the problem is that certain of the "minimum" requirements mentioned above are not being met at present and that it is becoming increasingly more difficult to maintain the status quo in the face of increasing Communist pressures. The existence of such a situation is an important part of the argument for seeking an agreement with the Soviet Union as discussed under an earlier paragraph. For example:

a. Political Freedom - The legitimate government of Berlin is not allowed to exercise its authority in the Soviet Sector.

b. Freedom of Access - All surface traffic -- except that of the Allied Occupation Forces -- moves only with the permission and under the control of the "GDR". Harassment is chronic and some types of traffic are entirely blocked. Allied access is substantially dependent on continued Soviet compliance with existing arrangements.

c. Unity of Germany and Unity of Berlin - The separation of East from West Germany is almost complete, and only limited freedom of circulation remains between East and West Berlin. East Berlin has become "the capital of the GDR".

d. Self-Determination - The Berlin population's approval of the status quo tends to be obscured by the emphasis given to Allied occupation rights.

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e. Reduction of Tension - Tension has been chronic in Berlin since 1946 and the situation has been critical since November 1958.

6. (U) Classification is derived from draft working paper "The Berlin Question", dated 1 April 1960 (SECRET) and cannot be downgraded until subject paper is downgraded.

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TAB B

Some Army Staff Comments on Working Group Drafts
(Submitted Informally to ISA)

1. (S) The significance for Free World strength of Berlin as a symbol should be given much more emphasis. Because of this symbolic significance, serious military consequences would arise from some of the possibilities discussed in the drafts. To Americans, to our allies, to the neutrals, and to the Sino-Soviet Bloc alike, Berlin is a symbol of US determination and power. We have consistently shown our will and ability to keep West Berliners free. Both are implicit in an unbroken series of actions ranging in scale from the Berlin airlift to an argument about scribbblings on a box-car. Both have been widely noted by peoples and governments throughout the world, who watch these events closely and draw their own inferences. Some of the Berlin outcomes analyzed in these papers would be taken by these observers as signifying diminished US determination and strength. Such inferences, warranted or not, would act to erode our power position by lowering the confidence and hence determination of our weaker allies, by diluting the cohesion of our alliances, and by reducing our influence over neutrals. Our military effectiveness would thus be lowered at the very moment when the danger of war has been increased by giving the Soviets an opportunity to underestimate US willingness to fight.

2. (S) As an example, . . . paragraph 4.b)iii) suggests that the Allies should make concessions which are more apparent than real. Actually, it would be most unwise to do so. Concessions which were apparent to the world at large would have an adverse psychological impact whose ultimate implications for Free World strength would far outweigh the minor local gain.

3. (S) The psychological consequences have been inadequately treated on . . . in paragraph 4.c)ii)B), which states: "A reduction of the Allied Forces in Berlin might be regarded by the Berlin population as the first step towards their eventual withdrawal in toto." The effect of this conclusion upon the determination of West Berliners to remain, to resist, and to expand the Berlin economy should be considered. So should the significance for our alliances of similar conclusions drawn elsewhere throughout the world. It must be recognized that to cut down the Berlin garrison would be to cut down our military effectiveness world-wide, through tarnishing the image of America as the strong, determined protector of Berlin.

4. (S) Further, a serious omission occurs on page 8, where among the disadvantages of seeking a new contractual basis, the psychological impact is not even mentioned.

5. (S) In paragraph 2e it is asserted that the Soviets would, if they abandoned their occupation rights in Berlin, "be less inhibited from exerting pressures (either directly or through the 'GDR') and the Allies would be less able to resist them." This statement seems to overlook the fact that what deters the Soviets and narrows their array of possible pressures is the presence of Allied soldiers, which indicates the determination of the Allies to defend the freedom of West Berliners.

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U. (S) Recommend the following specific changes also be made:

a. Page 3, paragraph 3d. Add this sentence: "This would seriously increase the risk of war."

REASON: In the parallel subparagraph (3f on page 2) the point is made that standing firm could lead to war. It is essential to recognize that the principal danger of war arising out of the Berlin situation lies in Soviet overestimation of what gains they can achieve without war. It is vital that the US avoid leading the Soviets into underestimating our determination. Probably the quickest way for the US to inadvertently bring on a war would be to cause the Soviets to overreach themselves.

b. Page 5, paragraph B.2.a)(ii). Delete the words "if they remained."

REASON: The introductory sentence of paragraph B.2.a) rejects several solutions which are "so obviously undesirable as to require no further discussion." A Berlin with no US, UK, and French troops is clearly in this category, since it is the physical presence of these troops that has kept, now keeps, and will continue to keep West Berliners free.

c. Page 3 of the four-page draft, paragraph 4.c)(1)(C). Change to read:

~~"The renunciation of nuclear weapons for the Allied Forces in Berlin might lead to Soviet demands for inspection and control, or might eventually deprive the Allied Forces of their military effectiveness."~~

REASON: The military effectiveness of the Allied Forces in Berlin depends upon their ability to gain or maintain control of land areas and people, not to destroy them. Nuclear weapons, representing a degree of force inappropriate to the situation, would be irrelevant to the main missions of the forces in Berlin.

7. (U) Classification is derived from draft working paper "III The Berlin Question," dated 18 March 1960 (SECRET) and cannot be downgraded until subject paper is downgraded.

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